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Abstract
Common–interest community agreements on private lands provide opportunity and scale for wildlife management.— Private lands are critical to conservation planning for wildlife, worldwide. Agriculture subsidies, tax
incentives, and conservation easements have been successfully used as tools to convert cropland to native
vegetation. However, uncertain economies threaten the sustainability of these incentives. The wildlife management profession is in need of innovative models that support effective management of populations. I argue
that biologists should consider the option of facilitating the development of private reserves to reduce the
dependence of conservation on public investment. Private reserves can be enhanced by creating common–
interest communities, which reduce the problem posed by limited size of individual properties. Cross–property
agreements between landowners can provide economic incentives through forms of ecotourism, energy production, and/or enhanced agricultural production. I share two case studies that demonstrate how cross–property
agreements may be beneficial to landowner’s finances and conservation of diverse wildlife communities, as well
as providing an efficient structure for NGOs and management agencies to engage and support landowners.
Key words: Conservation biology, Conservancy, Economics, Landscape, Policy, Private lands.
Resumen
Acuerdos comunitarios de interés común sobre los terrenos privados proporcionan oportunidades y extensión para
la gestión de la naturaleza salvaje.— En todo el mundo, los terrenos privados son críticos para la planificación de
la conservación de la naturaleza salvaje. Los subsidios agrícolas, los incentivos fiscales y las servidumbres para
la conservación han sido utilizados con éxito como herramientas para convertir las tierras de cultivo en vegetación
nativa. Sin embargo, las incertidumbres económicas amenazan la sostenibilidad de dichos incentivos. La gestión
profesional de la naturaleza salvaje precisa de la innovación de los modelos que dan soporte efectivo a la gestión de
las poblaciones. Opino que los biólogos deberían considerar la opción de facilitar el desarrollo de reservas privadas,
con el fin de reducir la dependencia de la conservación basada en las inversiones públicas. Puede estimularse la
creación de reservas privadas creando comunidades de interés común, que reduzcan el problema impuesto por
el tamaño limitado de las propiedades individuales. Los acuerdos entre propietarios sobre sus terrenos pueden
proporcionar incentivos económicos en forma de ecoturismo, producción de energía y/o una mejor producción
agrícola. Comparto los estudios de dos casos que demuestran cómo los acuerdos entre propiedades pueden
beneficiar tanto a las finanzas de los propietarios de las tierras como a la conservación de diversas comunidades
silvestres, así como proporcionar una estructura eficaz para ONGs y agencias de gestión en el compromiso de
dar soporte a los propietarios.
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Introduction
Private lands are critical to conservation planning
for wildlife worldwide. However, conservation efforts
have primarily focused on public lands (Knight, 1999;
Brown, 2010). Public lands certainly offer permanency
of purpose, and public lands biologists enjoy a large
degree of ownership of the decision to implement
management decisions on the landscape. These strategies may be effectual when public lands dominate
a region or country (fig. 1, table 1).
But, private lands (defined as land under freehold or leasehold by individuals, not including land
native communal lands; Swift et al., 2003) comprise
the majority of many countries’ land base (table 1).
Thirty–six of 50 US states have > 75% of their area
managed by private landowners (fig. 1). Private
lands biologists work in an arena in which they can
only offer support for decisions in a landscape that
is highly volatile with regard to alternative land uses.
Both game species and threatened species stand to
gain from well–positioned strategies for conservation
on private lands. Conservation on private lands has
emerged as a critical direction (Knight, 1999).
Here, I describe challenges to private lands conservation from logistic and ecological perspectives. I
suggest that common–interest communities should be
considered as a viable option to create incentives for
conservation on private reserves, while also providing
scale that can support ecological processes that lead to
successful conservation efforts. I assess the most common incentive tools for conservation on private lands.
And, I provide two case studies to support Schultz’s
(2010) suggestion that society’s demand for natural
places may operate to encourage private landowners
to work across property lines to produce goods and
services that large, intact landscapes can provide.
Challenges
Challenges to provide incentives
The primary challenge to conservation on private lands
is to provide an incentive to landowners, as conservation measures may conflict with ventures designed
to realize economic value from the land investment.
Simply stated, landowners/investors must realize a
profit. Aldo Leopold, writing in the 1940s, expressed
frustration with farmers in Wisconsin who did not continue to implement soil conservation measures after an
initial 5–year period of public investment of labor and
machinery (Leopold, 1949). That frustration pervades
the ranks of conservationists today, especially those
who are not empathetic with the notion that resilient
conservation practices must stand on the shoulders
of economically resilient farm and ranch ventures.
Wunder (2000) stated that the success of conservation incentives depends on the structure inherent
in the mode of participation—how does conservation
compare with other productive activities? Conservation incentives will have conservation impact only if
they change labor and land allocation decisions on a
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sustainable basis. In the US, the incentive challenge
is perhaps greatest in regions with productive soils
and adequate precipitation (fig. 2), where row–crop
agriculture is the wise investment on the landscape
because of record high prices for corn (fig. 3; July
2012 spot market, Nebraska USA: US$275–314/
metric ton), soybeans (US$588–624/metric ton), and
wheat (US$293–330/metric ton).
Agriculture subsidies
The Food Security Act of 1985 ('Farm Bill'; Brown, 2010)
served as a subsidy program to address concerns of
soil erosion (wind and water) and price supports in the
US. Conservation efforts are now implicit objectives
in the current Farm Bill, and Farm Bill programs have
been used as the primary method to convert cropland
to native vegetation with successful short–term benefits
(Haufler, 2005). Indeed, the job title of private lands
biologists in the US is commonly 'Farm Bill Biologist'.
The Farm Bill is an extensive government program; the
Conservation Reserve Program (one program within
the Farm Bill) paid US$1.7 billion in annual payments in
2012 to 737,699 contracts (most 10–year) on 409,253
farms (11,975,550 ha; United States Department
of Agriculture, 2012). Similar subsidy programs are
available in Europe through the Common Agricultural
Policy (Pain & Pienkowski, 1997), but are not an option
in most Latin American Countries because of budget
priorities (Swift et al., 2003).
It is very reasonable to expect that the combination
of the US’ current budget shortfalls and the high rental
rates now needed to compete with current rental rates
offered for production purposes (fig. 3) may result in
a loss of the diversity of types of direct payments in
the next Farm Bill that would benefit wildlife habitat.
There is no argument that subsidy programs have
created benefits for wildlife on millions of acres in the
US (Haufler, 2005), but the future of this program as
the primary means to support conservation on private
lands is in doubt.
Tax incentives
A recent development in several states in the US is the
availability of tax incentives to farmers who pledge to
keep their land in agricultural production or landowners
with forests who pledge to manage them in an approved
manner (Salkon et al., 2001). Agricultural tax credits
may be useful to wildlife conservation in regions with
a high degree of urban expansion, as the incentive
may keep the land owner from transforming the farm
into residential communities or industrial complexes.
For example, in Nebraska, USA, a Greenbelt
Tax was created to reduce development of urban
areas along rural, riverine corridors (T. LaGrange,
Nebraska Game and Parks Commission, personal
communication). Agricultural landowners typically see
their property values increase if urban growth creates
development potential for their farm land. A person
owning 65 ha in Lancaster County, Nebraska, for
example, would be levied an additional US$2600 in
annual property taxes if their land’s value increased
from US$1200/ha to US$3600/ha. Such an increase
might surpass current economic margins for crop
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Fig. 1. Percent of area under private ownership (non–state or non–federal) in the states of the USA,
based on data collected by the Natural Resource Council of Maine.
Fig. 1. Porcentaje de propiedad privada (ni estatal, ni federal) en los estados de EUA, basado en datos
recogidos por el Consejo de Recursos Naturales de Maine.

production; it might be seen as especially unpalatable for a landowner interested in non–agricultural,
recreational uses. A housing development or office
complex could result. The Green Belt Tax status would
allow the landowner to pay property taxes based on
the agricultural value of the land rather than the full
market value. It should be noted that the Greenbelt
Tax only applies to agricultural and horticultural uses;
a private nature reserve would not qualify for the
incentive. However, the precedent of tax incentives
exists, and state laws could be structured to provide
tax incentives to private landowners who dedicate and
properly manage a private nature reserve.
Salkon et al. (2001) noted that tax incentives do
not provide long term security for conservation efforts
(table 2). Tax incentives for conservation have been
used in some Latin American countries, but they are
often withdrawn in times of economic insecurity (Swift
et al., 2003). Even if the tax incentive remains, the
price paid by developers for land may eventually exceed the maximum compensation through tax relief.
Conservation easements
Easements are used throughout the US (Salkon et al.,
2001), Latin America (Swift et al., 2003), and Europe
(conservation covenants; Kiesecker et al., 2007) by
private landowners to restrict the future uses of their

property. A land trust is often created to be the recipient of the benefits of the easement (Schutz, 2010),
and the recipient purchases the easement from the
landowner. Easements are attractive to landowners,
because the land remains in private ownership and
owners continue to live on the land and derive benefit
from farming, ranching, forestry, or other activities.
Landowners often receive income from the sale of the
easement, and this sale value varies by the market value of the land, the conservation need for the property
(in fact, some landowners may find it difficult to find
a third party with interest to purchase an easement),
and local agreements. A landowner may donate a
portion or all of the sale of the easement back to the
land trust, reducing their income from the easement
sale. However, their contribution may be considered
a charitable donation, which can provide significant
income and/or estate tax benefits derived from the
state and federal government (Salton et al., 2001).
Conservation easements are usually designed to be
perpetual in nature (table 2). But, as Schutz (2010) noted,
such easements are enabled by state legislation, and
easements are the common subject of legislation (e.g.,
Legislature of Nebraska, 2012) that would affect their use.
Of primary concern in rural districts is the potential loss
of property tax, and thus support to county government
and local schools. Easements are often the first step
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Table 1. Percentage of land area of select
countries that is in private ownership: a Private
ownership statistics not available; percentage
represents percent of country in agricultural land
use; b China practices public land ownership
with no freeholds, only leaseholds.
Tabla 1. Porcentaje de tierra de propiedad
privada de los países seleccionados:
a
Estadísticas de propiedad privada no
disponibles; el porcentaje representa el tanto
por ciento de la tierra con uso agrícola; b China
practica la propiedad pública de la tierra,
que no permite la propiedad absoluta, sino
únicamente el arrendamiento.
Country

% Source

Australia

15 Forbes (1985)

Canada

10 Cahill & McMahon (2010)

China

0b Ho (2001)

Ethiopia

10a Cahill & McMahon (2010)

Germany

52a Cahill & McMahon (2010)

Latin American						
countries (most)
Namibia

> 80 Swift et al. (2003)
43 Shaw & Marker (2011)

Spain

83a Cahill & McMahon (2010)

Tanzania

11a Cahill & McMahon (2010)

United Kingdom > 80 Harrison et al. (1977)
United States, 					
excluding Alaska
Zimbabwe

75 NRCS (2001)
42a Cahill & McMahon (2010)

towards the eventual sale of the property to a state or
federal wildlife agency that may pay no property taxes, or
may pay property taxes at a much lower property tax rate
than a private landowner (Lancaster County, Nebraska,
standard rate: US$0.0027/$100 valuation; Lower Platte
South Natural Resources District rate: US$0.0004/$100
valuation; Lancaster County, 2011). The loss of property
tax to Lancaster County, USA for the 65–ha property in
the previous example, would be $3900/year for land worth
US$3600/ha. Ten landowners making a similar decision
would reduce income to the County equal to one government salaried worker (e.g., teacher, road maintenance,
social aide). Therefore, the benefit to the individual (tax
relief) is seen as a cost to the local community.
Creation of reserves
A governmental or non–governmental organization
(NGO) may purchase a tract of land from an individual
for the purposes of creating a nature reserve. The
incentive to the individual is the fair market price (or

sometimes premium price) paid by the government or
NGO at the time of the sale. Thus, the land is removed
from development and can be restored to native vegetation or protected in a native state. Individuals can
also develop private reserves on their land, although
the official recognition (and economic incentives, if any)
of private reserves varies from country to country, as
well as from state to state within the US (Teer, 1999;
Salkon et al., 2001; Swift et al., 2003).
Private reserves are routinely considered in the
set of tools available to wildlife biologists engaged
with private landowners in Latin America (Swift et al.,
2003) and southern Africa (Powell, 2010; Shaw &
Marker, 2011), but they are not typically considered
by biologists in the US (Salton et al., 2001) with the
exception of the state of Texas (Teer, 1999). One
factor in this shortcoming is that wildlife management
students in the US are rarely required to take courses
in business, tourism, or entrepreneurism, while their
counterparts in nature conservation in southern Africa
or Latin America (as examples) receive their education
in the context of the economic benefits of properly
managed populations of wildlife.
Wildlife biologists have long been aware of the potential value from hunting, bird watching, nature walks,
and environmental education on private lands, although
resource ownership issues are complex (Freese, 1998;
Teer, 1999; Thompson & Edwards, 2009). Such values
are subject to variability in tourism markets, and the
size and location of the reserve will affect its value to
regional biodiversity, its draw to tourists or hunters, and
its capacity to provide economic benefit to the land
owner. These constraints or perceived risks may lead
land owners to make the decision to sell their property
to a government entity or NGO. Schutz (2010) suggests
that private reserves could be supported by government
during initial development to reduce these risks.
The advantage to private reserves is that they are
not usually dependent on public subsidies, and the
reserves generate profits as a private venture (table 2).
Private land conservation has typically concentrated
on methods that have substantial cost in public investment (through purchase to create a public reserve or
payment of annual subsidy), as well as eventual loss
of agriculture productivity and contribution to taxes
(Salton et al., 2001).
Challenges to support landowner decisions
Wildlife management decisions are complex and have
a level of uncertainty, even when made by trained
wildlife biologists. Thus, private landowners face
the same challenge of making smart decisions, and
should be trained in decision–making processes that
include the need for clarifying objectives, assessing
alternative management options, assessing potential
risk of alternatives, and coordinating decisions with
other current decisions (Gregory & Keeney, 2002).
Monitoring to determine the level of success of a management decision is also critical (Lyons et al., 2008).
Landowners are not typically trained in concepts
or techniques of wildlife management or conservation
biology. Fortunately, farmers and ranchers are usually trained to manage domestic plants and animals

Relative economic return/ha
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Row crops
Cattle
Wildlife

A		
B
Rainfall/soil productivity

Fig. 2. Relative economic return (per ha) of three potential commodities across a gradient of rainfall and
soil productivity from arid climate (left) to more mesic climate (right). A describes thresholds where cattle
grazing becomes more profitable than wildlife–based entrepreneurial activities, and B is threshold where
row crops become more profitable than cattle grazing. Lines showing relative economic return would be
expected to shift with market conditions.
Fig. 2. Retorno económico relativo (por ha) de tres productos potenciales a través de un gradiente de
precipitación y producción del suelo desde un clima árido (izquierda) a un clima más moderado (derecha).
A describe los umbrales donde el apacentamiento del ganado se hace más aprovechable que las actividades emprendedoras basadas en la fauna salvaje, y B es el umbral donde las cosechas se hacen más
provechosas que el pastoreo del ganado. Sería de esperar que la línea que muestra el retorno económico
relativo cambiase junto las condiciones del mercado.

(Powell, 2010), so concepts of population growth,
competition, and sustainable harvest are familiar.
Governments, agencies, NGOs, and universities have
a critical role to provide for education of landowners
(Swift et al., 2001). Training needs may be significant,
which will result in costs to the agencies or NGOs.
Ecological challenges to private lands conservation
Swift et al. (2001) suggested that there are implicit ecological challenges to addressing conservation concerns
on private lands: (1) size limitations of private property,
(2) ad hoc locations of reserves in relation to priority
conservation areas, and (3) the need for long–term
sustainability of a conservation system (table 2).
Property size limitations
Conservation of biodiversity necessitates a diverse set
of habitats (Toombs et al., 2010). The potential heterogeneity of habitats on a parcel of land increases with the
size of the property. Farm– or ranch–level heterogeneity
can be expected to be lower than landscape–level
heterogeneity, because of farm– and ranch–level management decisions (e.g., type of grazing system or
crop selection). As such, it would be rare for a single
property to provide the diverse array of habitats needed for the conservation of a diverse community. So,
biologists must engage with multiple landowners across

the landscape to achieve most conservation goals in
traditional incentive programs (table 2).
Second, the annual home range of most species of
wildlife goes beyond the borders of a single property
(e.g., sage grouse [Centrocercus urophasianus] mean
annual movements: 11.3 km: Connelly et al., 1988;
typical movements of > 10 km for white–tailed deer
[Odocoileus virginianus] and mule deer [Odocoileus
hemionus]: Frost et al., 2009). A landowner’s efforts
to support the breeding needs of a deer population,
for example, could be thwarted by a neighboring
landowner’s overharvest during the fall. Efficient and
effective use of conservation funds necessitates that
the scale of animal movements be contained within
the scale of conservation efforts (Scott et al., 1999).
Last, private reserves that use iconic species for
hunting or non–consumptive income face the challenge that many of these species occur at relatively low
densities (Freese, 1998). Sustainable trophy harvest of
white–tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus), for example,
requires that hunters follow a strategy for take that
allows deer to grow older and reach trophy status,
as judged by antler size (Jenks et al., 2002). A single
landowner, by the merits of the number of trophy deer
required for profitable operation (one multi–day hunt
for a trophy deer, including meals, guiding, and lodging
may be approximately US$5,000), would have to own
thousands of acres to engage in a sustainable venture.
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Table 2. Comparison of selected incentive programs for conservation on private lands, with respect
to common ecological challenges after Swift et al. (2001). Programs are categorized with regard to
the source of the motivation to meet the challenge: Landowner. Challenge overcome through internal
landowner motivations; Public assistance. Challenge overcome through external motivations from
government or NGOs; No. Challenge not likely to be overcome; a Challenge met only with considerable
effort to target several neighbors; b Challenge met only through efforts to provide higher incentive to
landowners in a selected watershed or region.
Tabla 2. Comparación de los programas de incentivación para la conservación de los terrenos privados, con
respecto a los desafíos ecológicos comunes según Swift et al. (2001). Los programas están clasificados
según la motivación para enfrentarse al desafío: Landlowner. Propietario, enfrentarse al desafío por las
motivaciones internas del propietario; Public Assistance. Asistencia pública, enfrentarse al desafío por
motivaciones externas del gobierno o las ONGs; No. No es probable que se enfrente al desafío; a Desafío
encarado únicamente con considerable esfuerzo para incluir a varios vecinos. b Desafío encarado únicamente
a través de los esfuerzos para proporcionar mayores incentivos a los propietarios de la tierra en una región
o cuenca hidrológica determinada.
Ecological challenge
		
Incentive
Limited size

Protects
priority location

Long–term
sustainability

Agriculture subsidies

Public assistance

a

Public assistance

b

No

Tax incentives

Public assistance

a

Public assistance

b

No

Conservation easements

Public assistance

a

Public assistance

b

Private reserve: single owner

No

No

Landowner
Landowner

Private reserve: 					
common–interest community
Landowner
No
Landowner

Ad hoc location of private lands
Conservation biologists often identify ‘gaps’ in the
landscape that are not protected by public reserves,
yet are critical to a species of conservation concern
(Scott et al., 1993). Private reserves have the potential to fill such gaps, but not all private properties
are positioned to connect corridors or create buffers
around public areas (Swift et al., 2001) and thus
complete a conservation strategy. Regardless of the
tool used to provide incentive for conservation, this
challenge will continue to require wildlife biologists
to prioritize the geographic scope of their efforts on
private lands (table 2).
The need for long–term protection
Conservation strategies should be aimed to increase
resilience. Humans have reduced the resilience of
agroecosystems by removing diversity and altering
disturbance regimes. As altered systems, they may
be more vulnerable to perturbation, and may quickly
shift from a desired to less desired state (Folke et
al., 2004). The perturbation may be ecological in
nature (e.g., drought), but also political, social, or
economic.
The conservation incentives offered by agriculture
subsidies, while affecting dramatic acreage of land (Barbarika, 2009), are not resilient to economic fluctuations.
Grain prices (e.g., maize; fig. 3) are highly unpredictable

from year, which creates instability for long–term conservation because tradeoffs between subsidy payments and
potential income from crop production are in constant
flux. The benefits of local conservation efforts (e.g., Negus et al., 2010; Matthews, 2009) can disappear when
incentives become less attractive than another investment option (fig. 4). Of the incentives traditionally used
by private lands biologists, only conservation easements
allow for long–term landscape transformation with the
assumption that enabling legislation is not withdrawn. In
contrast, owners of single– and multiple–owner private
reserves have internal incentives to be successful over
long periods of time, because of their personal investments in their ventures (table 2).
Common interest communities
Potential
Private landowners who are interested in innovative,
entrepreneurial conservation efforts will often have
a need to work beyond the property limits of their
land. Schutz (2010) suggested that common–interest
communities may be a viable means of distributing
benefits from nature–based entrepreneurial efforts on
landscapes. A common–interest community is defined
as an association of willing participants who accept
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Fig. 3. Annual market price paid for corn (US$ per bushel) in Nebraska, USA during 1908–2011. The 5–year
moving average is shown as a dotted line (data from the National Agricultural Statistics Service, USDA).
Fig. 3. Precio de mercado pagado anualmente por el maíz (US$ por cada 52 libras) en Nebraska, USA,
durante el periodo 1908–2011. La línea de puntos muestra el promedio de la variación (datos del Servicio
Estadístico Nacional de Agricultura, USDA).

rights and duties that are inherent in title to their real
estate (Schutz, 2010). A common example is a homeowners’ association found in urban development.
Schutz (2010) argues that the common–interest
community model could easily be extended to include
private lands for the benefit of wildlife populations.
Owners of a parcel of land within a present–day lake
association, for example, are obligated to engage in
and/or refrain from certain uses of their land. The
association might hold a lake as association property
for the benefit of the owners in common. Management
of the fishery is an example of services performed
by the association for its members, who may be
regulated on the type of dock or boat housing they
may construct with an eye toward holding property
values at high levels for all members (Korth & Klessig,
1990). Another form of common–interest community
is a timber cooperative (Barten, 2001). Small, private
landowners form agreements to market timber as an
association to derive higher prices. The land remains
in private ownership, but decisions on timber harvest
are made as a group. As forest management is an
indirect form of wildlife management, timber cooperatives are well–suited to develop additional income
streams such as hunt leases or hiking retreats.
It is easy to imagine the formation of a common–interest community by neighboring farmers or ranchers.
Such arrangements between neighbors can provide
participants with geographically larger operations and
greater economic return without purchasing more land,

while also providing the legal framework in which to
make joint decisions and to distribute costs and income
among the participants. As such, common–interest
communities would be well–suited to be used by private
landowners with interests in creating a private reserve
to support nature–based, entrepreneurial ventures.
Benefits of scale for wildlife
The formation of a common–interest community
among neighbors results in the joint management of
parcels of land. The co–managed landscape could
be suitable for effective management of wildlife. This
larger landscape under management allows structural
heterogeneity of habitat to be established at multiple
scales (Toombs et al., 2010), which further support
diverse communities and protect rare species (Naidoo
et al., 2011). In contrast, subsidy programs, tax incentives, conservation easements, and single–owner
private reserves cannot, per se, provide the scale
needed for conservation (table 2).
Large, co–managed properties allow the establishment of 'zones' for management. Zones might be
constructed around habitat types. Larger reserves allow
more zones for different activities; more habitat zones
should also result in more species of wildlife (Toombs
et al., 2010), facilitating diverse use by tourists and
increasing economic return (Naidoo et al., 2011).
Zonation can also be used to set aside portions
of the reserve for specific uses. For example, four
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Fig. 4. Area of private land under contract in the Conservation Reserve Program (Farm Bill) in Nebraska,
USA during 1986–2010. The initial year for the program was 1986 (data from the National Agricultural
Statistics Service, USDA).
Fig. 4. Área de terrenos privados bajo contrato del Programa de Conservación de Reservas (Conservation Reserve Program, Farm Bill) en Nebraska, USA, durante el periodo 1986–2010. El año de inicio
del programa fue 1986 (datos del Servicio Estadístico Nacional de Agricultura, USDA).

neighboring ranches in the Great Plains of the US
may each support populations of greater prairie–
chickens (Tympanuchus cupido) on grazing lands
for cattle (fig. 5A). If the ranchers are individually
approached by a company offering to lease lands
for wind energy platforms, each rancher might want
to maximize the number of turbines on their property because of direct competition with neighbors
for a limited number of leases. Each ranch, then,
would potentially be host to wind power (fig. 5B),
and planning for siting would be conducted on a
ranch–by–ranch basis. Some evidence suggests
that prairie–chickens avoid large structures on the
landscape (Hagen et al., 2011; Pruett et al., 2009),
so it is possible that wind development on the four
ranches could cause a decline in space available
for prairie–chickens (fig. 5B). In addition, the access
roads required for the wind development could also
reduce the grazing capacity on each ranch. An alternative scenario would be for the four ranches to
form a common–interest community with the purpose
to provide more effective planning and profit–base
from wind energy, wildlife–based enterprises, and
cattle. The results of a joint effort to find the most
appropriate location for wind energy could allow the
concentration of wind platforms on one section of the
association’s lands, which would leave the majority
of the prairie–chickens on the lands unaffected by
foreign structures. The ranch might be able to develop a rotational grazing schedule that could allow
them to maintain stocking levels, across all ranches,
close to the pre–association levels (fig. 5C).

Benefits of scale to investors
Private reserves will survive as long as private landowners can maintain economic benefits. As investments,
conservation done in this manner has the potential to
pay for itself, but this demands that landowners have
the training and education needed to make good
decisions.
Marketing strategies for ecotourism can be conducted more effectively and efficiently on behalf of a set
of landowners with a large land base than for a single,
smaller property (Powell, 2010). If separate landowners
are competing for limited tourists, each must produce
marketing materials, maintain web sites, attend expositions, and provide staff to make reservations. An
association of landowners can reduce these costs by
cooperating. With a more diverse landscape (a better
product) to market, an association may also realize
more income (Naidoo et al., 2011).
Last, landowners may also find NGOs and management agencies willing to provide more time and expertise to facilitate management plans, given the history of
decisions of the landowner group (Powell, 2010). The
association offers the advantage of a single contact
point, and a mechanism to develop one management
plan that impacts multiple farms or ranches.
Case studies
Conservation through common interest communities
on private reserves is a model that should be consi-
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Fig. 5. Depictions of the distribution of potential sources of revenue on four ranches in the Nebraska
Sandhills region: A. Status quo, with cattle grazing and greater prairie–chicken populations on each of the
ranches; B. Introduction of wind energy development on the four competing ranches; livestock stocking
is potentially reduced, and prairie–chickens could be relegated to areas away from turbines (see text); C.
Distribution of elements in B, but in the context of a common–interest community that optimizes wind energy
development and cattle grazing, which allows for maintenance of prairie–chicken populations. Dotted lines
show property boundaries, but allow flow of income and expenses among ranches.
Fig. 5. Descripciones de la distribución de las fuentes potenciales de ingresos de cuatro ranchos en la región
de Nabraska Sandhills: A. Status quo, con ganado pastoreando y poblaciones de gallos de las praderas grandes en cada uno de los ranchos; B. Introducción de instalaciones de energía eólica en los cuatro ranchos; se
observa una reducción potencial del ganado, y los gallos de las praderas podrían quedar relegados a zonas
lejanas a las turbinas (véase el texto); C. Distribución de los elementos en B, pero en el contexto de una
comunidad de intereses comunes que optimice el desarrollo de la energía eólica y el pastoreo del ganado,
lo que permite el mantenimiento de las poblaciones de gallos de las praderas. Las líneas de puntos son los
límites de las propiedades, pero permiten el flujo de entradas y salidas entre los ranchos.
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dered, especially when ecotourism efforts can result
in meeting biodiversity or population goals for species
of interest (Naidoo et al., 2011). Ecotourism is built
on the notion that value can be realized from wildlife
and landscapes (Freese, 1998). The following case
studies support the theory that conservation can be
achieved through the motivations of individual landowners, when the appropriate structure is in place to
empower them. Other examples of common interest
communities exist throughout the world, especially
in Australia, western North America, and central
and southern Africa (Schutz, 2010); these two case
studies provide details for contrasting examples on
two continents.
Freehold conservancies in Namibia
An example of a landscape–scale management system can be found in the grasslands and shrublands
of Namibia, in southern Africa, where cattle farmers
have joined together to form conservancies. Before
conservancies were established, many farmers built
2–m game fences to restrict the flow of large, game
animals. Conservancies provided a mechanism for
neighbors to benefit from an integrated landscape
(Shaw & Marker, 2011). Namibian landowners form
agreements with neighbors about consumptive use
limits, habitat management, water management, and
ecotourism development. Namibian conservancies
have from 5 to 58 farms and range from 75,650 to
500,000 ha; size is generally limited, socially, by
distances that neighbors are comfortable driving for
meetings (Powell, 2010).
Namibia is now home to 23 private conservancies,
which are registered with the Ministry of Environment and Tourism. Each conservancy must have a
constitution, which defines the relationship among its
members and outlines its initial management plan.
Conservancies may negotiate with the Ministry to
become exempt from typical game permits and use
restrictions (Shaw & Marker, 2011). Most conservancies charge member fees to support basic operation
or conservation efforts, either on a per hectare or per
member basis (Powell, 2010).
Namibia’s conservancies each have a distinct
flavor because of the heritage of their members
and the landscapes in which they exist. Wildlife
conservation and poaching protection are primary
goals, which contribute to conservation efforts. But,
members also list social networking as a goal, which
indicates the importance of communication and trust
between members. Last, and perhaps realistically,
a goal of conservancies is profit. Powell (2010)
quoted one conservancy officer, reflecting on their
membership: ‘In their eyes, the conservancy will
only be valuable for them if the conservancy can
increase their profit.’
Namibia’s conservancies also exist across a
gradient from arid to semi–arid to more mesic
conditions. As the land becomes more productive
(better soils, more precipitation), tradeoffs occur in
profitability of potential ventures (fig. 5C; Brown,
pers. comm., Namibian Nature Foundation). Wil-
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dlife in Namibia are uniquely adapted to more arid
zones (relative to domestic animals), and tend to
be preferred as an investment in that environment;
some landowners in arid regions of Namibia have
removed all livestock from their farms in favor of
‘farming with wildlife.’ However, in more productive
zones, cattle co–exist with wildlife, because of the
economic return that is available from livestock
(fig. 2; Powell, 2010). Such a gradient creates
contrasting landscapes in which for biologists to
engage landowners; namely, private reserves and
other conservation efforts may be easier to develop
in regions with less productive lands (fig. 2). Row
crops are not common in Namibia, but biologists in
regions that can support row crops will encounter
a situation in which the conservation trade–offs are
further complicated by the high potential for return
from production agriculture. Biologists are very
aware of the geographic location of thresholds at
which grazing becomes feasible (fig. 2A) and at
which row–crop agriculture becomes more profitable
than grazing (fig. 2B).
Greater Gracie Creek Landscape
An example of the emerging nature–based entrepreneurship on private reserves can be found near on a
4,800–ha ranch near Burwell, Nebraska, USA. In 2001,
the younger generation of the Switzer family voiced
an interest to return to the family’s cattle ranch, yet
economic reality demonstrated that such a decision
was impossible without additional ventures. The family
began to diversify their cattle ranch by building a lodge
and offering bird watching, boating, guided hunting, and
horseback riding. The family found economic value in
the leks (breeding grounds) of sharp–tailed grouse
(Tympanuchus phasianellus) and greater prairie–chickens, which they now share with their visitors during
March and April each spring. The family business,
Calamus Outfitters, provided initial opportunities for
the second generation to live on the ranch, but the
venture’s success was limited by the size of the ranch
(Sortum, 2011).
Recently, the Switzers joined with two neighboring
ranches to form general agreements regarding access
and use. The three ranches, as newly branded Greater
Gracie Creek Landscape, have become the first private
land area in Nebraska to be designated an Important
Bird Area by the Audubon Society. The joint group also
allows the Switzer’s to market their neighbors’ special
beef, known as Morgan Ranch American Wagyu Kobe
(Sortum, 2011). To date, the agreement between the
Switzers and their neighbors has not officially reached
the level of a legal association described as the common–interest community (Schutz, 2010), but those
discussions continue.
The Switzers have become known as advocates
for grassland conservation in the region, and will soon
host the first annual Prairie Chicken Festival to showcase educational and recreational activities on their
ranch. Regardless of their fondness for conservation,
the reality of private lands conservation is expressed
in their statement: 'If it pays, it stays'.
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Conclusion
Common–interest communities, such as Namibia’s
conservancies and the fledgling associated ranches in
Nebraska, can provide incentive and scale for effective
wildlife management. Private lands biologists should
consider the potential for private investment to fuel
conservation efforts that can be long–lasting and robust to changing economic and political environments.
Management agencies and NGOs must train biologists to facilitate multi–owner groups to promote cross–
property agreements for private reserves. The legal
means to such ends will vary around the globe; in the
US, the simple agreement used to form common–interest communities such as housing and lake associations
can be applied in rural settings (Schutz, 2010).
The toolbox available to private lands biologists will
continue to include, in some form, agriculture subsidies, tax incentives, and conservation easements.
But, it is time to embrace opportunities that exist on
private reserves. Coordinating and facilitating the
development of private reserves in the context of a
common–interest community is not easy, as it involves
managing people (Powell, 2010). But, Knight (1999)
argued that the easy steps in conservation have
been taken, and the future will involve many tough
conversations and investments of time and energy to
make advances in conservation on private properties.
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